In considering the limited scale and proficiency of Russia’s local administrative body, one may question how it effectively governed such substantial populations and vast expanses. The straightforward explanation is that, for the most part, neither did it govern nor control them.2
Throughout history, governments have confronted the necessity of acquiring adequate real-time information across societal and political strata. As John P. Le Donne has aptly put it, “Lacking substantial revenue, appropriately documented, a government’s latitude for action is considerably restricted, both in its foreign policy pursuits and in establishing the pillars of a refined society”.3 The discourse surrounding the extent to which the Russian administration in the 18th century stayed abreast of matters within its provinces has oftentimes been disregarded. However, in recent decades, the notion that Russia was “under-administered” has garnered more attention, with scholars exploring various elements of the empire’s structural evolution through this lens.4 Stephen Velychenko notes, “Albeit not formally defined in the academic literature, and untranslatable into Russian, the term ‘under-administered’ encapsulates the notion that a government which has effectively monopolized the use of physical force does not boast an adequate number of administrators per capita to implement policies with efficiency and efficacy. Viewed in this light, a distinguishing attribute of the tsarist bureaucracy was not its immense size or maladies but its scarcity”.5 Consequently, the density of civil servants in proportion to the populace is considered a pivotal gauge of the Russian Empire’s “under-administration”.
Some historical data exists concerning the magnitude of Russia’s bureaucracy towards the conclusion of the 17th and commencement of the 18th centuries. Estimates by Ludmila Pisarkova reveal that in 1698, the ratio of administrative staff to the broader populace was 1:2250, which rose to 1:3400 by 1726.6 Velychenko posits that until 1795, the ratio of governmental clerks to the populace in Russia and select European nations (like Austria, Britain, and Prussia) was relatively similar (averaging 1:1375 and 1:1833, respectively).7 However, Velychenko refrains from decisively asserting whether the Russian Empire was “adequately managed” at the onset and midpoint of the 18th century,8 or what volume of bureaucrats was deemed necessary to afford the government the capability to make what are referred to as informed and sound decisions. The majority of historians concur that Russia fell short on governance in the 19th century.9 This discussion primarily delves into whether the Russian government circa the mid-18th century possessed adequate information sources to formulate a judicious fiscal strategy and whether there existed sufficient personnel for tax collection and revenue reporting (in this case, the head tax); thereby examining the question of whether or not Russia was “under-administered”.
The choice of utilizing the head tax as a focal point stems from its status as a primary direct imposition in Russia, with its proceeds largely funding military ventures during times of peace. Upon its introduction by Peter the Great, efforts were made to streamline its administration and collection. The taxable foundation remained static for numerous years. Financial collection and apportionment were decentralized, ensuring that funds did not accumulate centrally but were directly channeled to designated endpoints based on official directives. This structure effectively addressed the critical logistical hurdle of fund delivery to the end-user. The government only received intelligence on tax receipts and disbursements through periodic reports. The process of head tax collection can thus be bifurcated into two interlinked procedures: the initial phase encompassing fund gathering, distribution, and delivery (the material tier); and the subsequent stage entailing reporting on monetary inflows and outflows (the informational tier). Both tiers were overseen by the same echelon of officials—provincial, regional, and local clerks.10
Was There an Adequate Quota of Public Officers for Revenue Collection?
Commencing in the 1730s, head tax collection was carried out at provincial administrative offices, where taxpayers (landholders, tenants, designated representatives, etc.) visited bi-annually (originally tri-annually) to remit finances to a clerk (e.g., a scribe) who documented the payment in one or multiple account ledgers; a taxpayer was expected to receive an acknowledgment confirming their payment within three days from the clerk. Enumerators (shchetchiki) supervised by a head tax officer (ofitser pri podushnom sbore) tabulated the funds, secured them in sacks and barrels, sealed the containers, then transported them via carts to predefined hubs under escort. Beneficiaries of the payment received confirmation receipts upon fund disbursement and the officials returned to their base of operations. Apart from the principal tax, taxpayers remitted service fees of two kopeks for every ruble toward clerical salaries (zhalovanie) and transportation expenses. Failure to meet payment deadlines and the accumulation of arrears led to retired soldiers being dispatched from the local provincial office to the locality, where they stayed at the expense of the debtors for a specified duration; such measures were legislatively mandated.11 In protracted cases of default, peasants or even landholders risked detention on account of their outstanding debts (na svoem koshte).
The count of government officers involved in tax collection was not significant: one or a couple of record keepers (podkantseliarist or kopiist) managed the finances and documented transactions, while one or two authorities (the tax collector, the regional overseer, etc.) oversaw tax collection and authenticated paperwork (u shcheta denezhnoi kazny). For example, in 1741, the Smolensk secretarial bureau had forty-six “secretaries, clerks, junior clerks and copyists”, with just three directly engaged in collecting tax money.13 The other forty-three staff members handled different payments, maintained various registers, and distributed resources. In 1738, there were roughly 214,000 adult males recorded as poll tax payers in the Smolensk territory.14 Examining the relationship between civil servants and regional populace yields two ratios: 1:4652 (the ratio of total regional officers to the male adult population) and 1:71,000 (the proportion of dedicated tax officials to the male adult population). These ratios do not account for a certain number of personnel: a troop of soldiers assigned with money carriage and debt retrieval. Listing 1 depicts the count of civil servants in diverse Russian regions in 1739.
The initial cluster of officers—from a colonel to an ensign—supervised tax levy execution. Alongside them, governors (voevody), who performed as tax officers during revenue reception, could have overseen the entire operation if administrative capacity was insufficient in a specific area. Thus, governors possessed the authority to validate all documents generated to log the amount of taxes accrued and were liable for any deficits. The greater portion, exceeding 80%, belonged to the second cluster which constituted errand squads mainly comprising retired rank-and-file soldiers tasked with logistical operations: delivering money, letters, and so forth. This cadre was in charge of the physical dimension of tax collection. The remainder, roughly 13%, handled money reception and accounting, managing the informational layer of tax collection.
The credibility of the data utilized for the outlined estimates is verified by the fact that, during the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the provincial clerical staff roster was defined and sanctioned by the Senate, with the personnel deployment process just commencing. It’s critical to emphasize that many provincial clerical positions remained unoccupied in practice. An instance is illustrative. In 1731, the local clerical staff in the Nizhnii provincial bureau detailed the reasons behind their failure to comply with the Senate’s mandate, despite being fully staffed in 1722–23 with 167 clerks as per the staffing chart. By 1732, their numbers had significantly dwindled. According to the staff’s account, thirty-seven officials had passed away, while sixty-two had been relocated, deserted, or penalized, leaving only sixty-seven personnel, some of whom were aged, infirm, or mentally unfit.19 The note specifically underscored that the Nizhnii local administration had reported their acute staff shortage to the authorities, but received neither a resolution nor even acknowledgment. Consequently, in ten years, the clerical headcount had plummeted nearly 60%.
The computations by central authorities regarding the upkeep costs of regional clerical offices were found to be fairly conservative, and, as mentioned earlier, these expenses were refunded through an added two-kopek charge levied on taxpayers. Per the General War Commissariat’s assessments, the civil servants’ stipends and supplementary expenses should have been balanced by the levy amount, presumably 75,000 rubles, amassed from 5.5 million male taxpayers. As per the roster, approximately 50,000 rubles annually went towards clerical salaries, another 5,000 rubles for administrative outlays, with a residual 20,000 rubles for the annual budget.20
In cases of tax delinquency, entire local officialdoms were penalized; moreover, until the mid-1730s, sequestration of estates and consequent confiscation was a prevalent punitive measure. The imposition and allocation of fines were opaque and inefficient due to the widespread time and bureaucratic hurdles involved in locating the culpable officer or assets throughout the empire. Consequently, substantial sums in fines remained unpaid for extended periods.
The efficiency of government departments is evidenced by the substantiality of poll tax payments. Scholars have validated that the amount of tax collected exceeded 90%.21 It is thereby reasonable to deduce that the process of poll tax collection in the Russian Empire during the 18th century illustrated notable effectiveness. Simultaneously, the level of tax revenues depended on various factors, including the gravity of the tax load on taxpayers and the alignment of state tax claims with the established legislation. The evaluation of bureaucratic personnel’s contribution is complex and the assessment of their impact on the entire tax collection and allocation process is challenging. Nevertheless, from the onset, the system was strategically organized to ensure its productive function, utilizing available personnel to prevent the populace from complete financial ruin. This objective was achieved, signifying that the bureaucratic capabilities of the Russian Empire in that context were satisfactory for facilitating tax circulation and furnishing the state governing system with the necessary resources for its operation.22
A notable case exemplifies an incident where the direct mechanism of poll tax collection encountered insurmountable hindrances. On October 15, 1736, at the Military College, an individual named Stepanov underwent interrogation. Stepanov reported that in 1722, while serving as a subordinate clerk in the Kostroma provincial office, he was dispatched to the Moscow Treasury Office carrying a box containing 7,000 rubles. At the Moscow Treasury Office, the local clerks declined to accept the money and directed him to an equipment office (mundirnaia kantora) where only a portion of the amount was acknowledged – 3,000 rubles. Subsequently, at the equipment office, Stepanov received an additional 11,000 rubles, making the total sum he was supposed to deliver to the St Petersburg commissariat 15,000 rubles. Accompanied by the ensign Kalashnikov, he commenced the journey to the Russian capital. Upon arrival at the commissariat, the revenue registrar, Akim Poletaev, received the funds; however, Stepanov did not obtain a confirmation receipt due to falling ill. In the aftermath of his recovery, his inability to return to service at the Kostroma office resulted from the absence of the receipt and a justified fear of potential imprisonment. Subsequently, pending clarification of all circumstances, Stepanov was detained.23 After a meticulous investigation, it transpired that the financial ledger maintained by Poletaev did not document the receipt of 11,000 rubles from Stepanov. Nevertheless, it did record a transaction from February 1722 stating that Kalashnikov, along with six enumerators (including Stepanov), conveyed 128,000 rubles from the Moscow equipment office. Subsequent to this revelation, it was decided to permit Stepanov to resume duties at the Kostroma provincial office.
This occurrence underscores that logistical challenges and a rudimentary accounting system could be accountable for financial discrepancies. While financial transactions were meticulously recorded in ledgers, permitting external parties to reconstruct detailed cash flows twelve years later; uncontrollable factors such as illness hindered accurate record-keeping. In this scenario, the absence of a written confirmation (receipt), coupled with the absence of submitted provincial details in the ledger, resulted in a misinterpretation of a 4,000 ruble deficit from the Kostroma provincial office, despite the accurate collection, dispatch, and delivery of the sum in question from Kostroma.
Officials as “Schreibmaschine”?24
Overview
An analysis of provincial administrative reports reveals a recurring statement in many that affirm the timely collection and dispatch of poll tax payments to designated destinations—per directives; however, the locals struggled to compile and forward financial reports concurrently due to a shortage of clerical staff.25 As per the report from the Zaraisk provincial office, efforts were underway to prepare accounts of the poll tax and the two-kopeck levy, though timely completion and transmission were impeded by insufficient manpower; at present, only one scribe (podkantseliarist) was enlisted.”26 A comprehensive assessment of the veracity of the provided rationale necessitates understanding the extent of financial document circulation in a regional administrative setting. These documents could be categorized into internal office records and external reporting.
Document Management in a Regional Administrative Office
At the provincial level, a significant amount of financial papers must have been generated and maintained. Further, from the inception of the poll tax until 1736 (when poll tax collection officers were instituted and reports on tax acquisition and distribution were unified), a region’s territory might have been segregated into multiple districts, each issuing its set of financial documentation.
For example, in January 1731, Governor Dmitrii Mikhailovich Novokshchenov transferred files from the Vladimir office to Captain Terentii Bogdanovich Mozovskii of the Estliandskii regiment.27 The document set included: a leather-bound alphabetical register endorsed by Colonel Korobov; list registers sealed by Major General Chernyshov and Colonel Korobov; printed vouchers; instructions from the colonel and commissar; financial tables and sample account books; previous year’s poll tax receipts sealed by a commissar; three capitation fee revenue accounts from that year sealed by the governor; one capitation fee expenditure register also sealed by Novokshchenov; decrees and memoranda from authorities; inventory logs and notebooks; and finally, diagrams and dispatches of the headquarters location by commissar Petr Mitkov.
A comparable dossier was handed to an infantry captain of the Narvskii regiment,28 Ivan Ivanovich Drozdov, in a regional clerical office of Vladimir province. Additionally, it comprised the following records: a register of forty-kopek fee incomes for the current year (1731); and a register of forty-kopek fee distributions.
Commencing from 1736, the mandatory list of books and registries to be preserved in a provincial office was standardized, as was the protocol for their compilation. Nevertheless, challenges persisted in record-keeping. On an annual basis, in provincial offices, an average of seven ledgers was maintained where transactions were diligently entered, as exemplified in a typical circumstance observed in the Oboian regional office in Belgorod province in 1753: a set of seven accounting documents retained continuously, with four typically situated on a clerk’s desk.29
Indeed, ledger completion was not the issue; rather, the problem lay in the storage and retrieval of archived materials, as evidenced in the ensuing account that addresses the questfor the suitable levy fee office allotment in Moscow in 1754.30. Given the lack of an extra chamber in the Metal Mining and Manufacturing College, the collection of levy fees was set up in the lower level of a regional bureau where there was merely one window and limited space, crammed with chests and crates (in total numbering thirty), stacked one on top of another reaching the ceiling, holding levy fee audit ledgers and spending vouchers. The government employees were equipped with just one desk due to the absence of space for another, and they toiled with candles even during summertime since sunlight did not penetrate their underground workplace. It comes as no surprise that in those conditions, detecting forged coins was quite challenging. Another issue revolved around storing the amassed money. On any given day, a hundred sacks and barrels brimming with coins could have been received from various regions concurrently, making it quite problematic to find storage spots for this money and for the carriers moving it. This group of carriers could have numbered more than fifty individuals arriving simultaneously. Officials often fretted about documents decaying or being consumed by rodents.31. In such settings, the main challenge lied not in drafting financial documents, which necessitated only fundamental skills like reading, writing, and arithmetic, but in archiving and accessing the stored records.
Initially, the plan was for all the essential records to be audited in the central governmental offices, and based on this, central government clerks would compile final financial statements. However, this plan did not endure. The implementation kicked off with Peter the Great’s Law (Plakat), which introduced a new regulation of directly sending accounting books endorsed by staff- (shtab) and chief- (ober) officers to the Auditing Office for yearly review and examination. Nevertheless, in 1728, it was reported to the Senate that the local inspection of financial documents had failed. The reason that turned a well-intentioned initiative into a fiasco was mundane: the audit could not be finished due to a shortage of personnel.32. As per the new regulations put in place in 1728, the individuals tasked with collecting the tax money under the supervision of governors were zemskii commissars. They were to transfer the collected dues to governors, who then forwarded the revenues to the heads of the regional authorities. The latter distributed the gathered levy fee among staff officers for delivery to the specific destinations as stipulated in the Military College’s decrees. The new provisions also dictated that regimental records and invoices should undergo scrutiny and audit at a commissariat first before being sent to the Auditing Office, where reports consolidating the figures for all Russian regions were prepared. However, the subsequent year (1729) exposed the flaws in the new arrangements: grievances were sent to the Military College from a commissariat highlighting that the commissariat’s staff were insufficient for auditing the invoices, lacking the manpower to fulfill the task, while concurrently, the Auditing Office was hesitant to assist, reluctant to assume someone else’s responsibilities. Evidently, the focal point was not the primary audit of accounting books, but the accurate examination of invoices (annual and semiannual). From that moment onward, completing financial reports gradually evolved into the primary duty of provincial clerical offices. Local clerks were to maintain records of the fundamental documentation and craft reports.
Reports from Provincial Clerical Offices
A substantial number of reports were anticipated to be assembled at local clerical offices. Records of levy fee deficits were compiled for yearly, semiannual, monthly, or fortnightly durations. The most common ones were for yearly, semiannual, and monthly intervals. By 1736, the design and arrangement of mandatory financial statements had been defined and transmitted to the local offices, where regional executives were responsible for completing the requisite forms and sending them back to the higher authorities. The lists were laid out as handwritten tables presenting details on the annual outstanding levy fee payments of three kinds—seventy-kopek fees, forty-altyn fees, and forty-kopek fees—since the most recent check, i.e., within the five- to ten-year period before the current one. In practice, the information on deficits pertaining to the same year, i.e., 1736, and the same area, would differ across various lists, not just for the current year (1736) but for all prior years as well. This disparity arose from the likelihood that tax obligations from any past period might have been settled in the current year without adjustments being made; it was overly time-consuming for a clerk to verify every document dated later than the last inspection each time a debt was settled.
The process of report generation was neither straightforward nor flawless. The initial hiccup was the inadequacies of core financial documentation. Initially, the tables in the records lacked grand totals. As a result, each time a reference to a document was required, its sums had to be recalculated. Additionally, directions regarding the format and content of the reports altered periodically, necessitating the auditing, recalculation, and restructuring of bulky tax ledgers, registers, and other documents in conformity with changing requisites. The government demanded meticulous bookkeeping of levy payment receipts and deficits; the extensive level of detail requested undeniably considerably slowed down the entire reporting system. Simon Dixon highlights that Ivan Pososhkov critiqued “needlessly intricate accounts” as early as 1724 in his Book of Poverty and Wealth, one of the premier Russian economic treatises.33
The second hurdle affecting the compilation of the reports stemmed from the idiosyncrasies in the thinking patterns of provincial state employees. Though challenging to substantiate, it should nonetheless be taken into account. At first glance, the task of completing a form appears simple. Nonetheless, the reports forwarded to the central authorities were crafted with liberty, and a thorough analysis exposes a diverse array of manners in which the data within report tables were presented. Numerous warnings and directives were dispatched by governmental offices to adhere to the standards for report formats, all to no avail.
Indeed, a communication from the Military College to the Senate in 1738 declared that: “[…] the records from the counting board (shchetnaia kantora) do not align with the guidelines of the Auditing Office; as a result, there will only be superfluous barriers and exchanges, but we are unable to audit the accounts […]”.34
Officials from the central authorities, along with some historians, viewed such conduct by provincial clerks as subversion. In 1768, Privy Counsellor Ivan Ivanovich Iushkov, the governor of the Moscow province, received a communication from a Commissariat Head Office: “The Moscow regional
office failed to exert their utmost effort in composing and dispatching accounts, spending all their time in futile writing”.35
The task of assembling data regarding the diverse impost payments for various societal segments was most likely exceptionally challenging for bureaucrats. According to the initial audit, there were a total of forty population groups listed in 1737 and adjusted to the columns of the tables, although this was not uniformly observed. In regions like the central area of the Russian Empire, where the self-identification process of major social groups (landowners, state and court peasants, and merchants) had nearly concluded, organizing information about deficiencies correlated with each group’s debt was relatively straightforward. However, in outlying regions where this process had just commenced, presenting overly detailed data resulted in inaccuracies in the reports. Consequently, lists from the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century were filled with extensive comments that often modified the interpretation of the data depicted in the tables. Adapting local material into patterns designed for central state bodies presented a challenge, especially when the methodology used by local clerks for allocating figures in lists remained ambiguous. The government’s stance was unequivocal: information had to be presented meticulously and in extensive detail, paradoxically leading to arbitrary preparation of provincial reports’ tables.
The initial two issues—the deficiencies in basic financial records and the idiosyncrasies in the modes of thinking of provincial civil servants—could be summarized as follows: provincial officials genuinely intended to fulfill their duties, but encountered hindrances in doing so. Another potential issue, akin to the former, though challenging to validate but crucial to acknowledge, was that provincial officials might have been reluctant to comply with the extravagant demands of the authorities. Local clerks handled money transactions appropriately, considering their duty completely fulfilled, yet they might have viewed the government’s insistence on meticulous reports as a caprice. While this behavior did not amount to direct sabotage, their understanding of financial transactions endowed them with a misplaced sense of authority.
The three outlined problems underscore the stagnation in bureaucratic processes due to “want of people”. However, the deficiency of clerks was not solely responsible for the inadequate acquisition of information by central state authorities; underqualified regional office staff were also unable to meet the state’s need for current and relevant financial data. Consequently, a harsh measure was implemented to compel provincial offices to provide the required information: clerks were physically restricted to their workspaces until the reports were completed.
Another obstacle impeding the flow of information to the government was the delay in report submission. Reports on tax collections routinely contained notes indicating provinces that had yet to submit their reports. For instance, the Military College communicated to the Senate that despite numerous directives issued between 1735 and 1737, no reports had been received from several areas including the Sviazhsk province of the Kazan region, Penza province, Viatka province, various towns in the Voronezh region, Eletsk, Tambov, Solikamsk, and Bakhmut provinces. Demands from central official bodies for timely submission of local reports were persistent, as evidenced by a series of dates spanning from December 1735 to January 1736.
Consequently, central office clerks faced dual challenges: they were inundated with improperly completed local reports that were arduous to summarize and merge into comprehensive lists, and simultaneously, they received no reports at all from numerous regions. As noted by Dixon, “growing sophistication in bookkeeping methods was more often a barrier than an aid to understanding”.
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